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M y questionz -z did Principia Mathematicaz precipitate a "Fregean revolution"?z -z can be analyzed to reveal at least two related but separate questions. (1) Did Principia precipitate a revolution in the history of mathematics? (2) Assuming that the answer to the Wrst question is aUrmative or negative, but still attributable to Russell, was that revolution "Fregean" and, if so, "Fregean" in what sense?
For much of the twentieth century, historiography of logic has responded without always clarifying the distinction between the two questions.
So far as (1) is concerned, the answer has been an equivocal "No". Rather, the generally accepted credit for Russell's role in spreading the 1 See, e.g., Risto Vilkko, "The Reception of Frege's BegriVschriftz ", Historia Mathematica 25 (1998) legacy of Frege gives the lion's share to The Principles of Mathematics, for the two appendices which gave Russell's exposition and analysis of Frege's logical theory and the discussion and proposed solution, in the theory of types, to the Russell paradox. The argument runs that, except for a brief, and entirely negative, reaction in a handful of reviews of Frege's 1879 BegriVsschrift, logicians ignored Frege's work until it was recalled to their attention by Russell in the Principles. The more recent consensus, however, is that Frege's work was not quite as ignored in the period between 1879 and 1903 as had been thought. 1 It would be more accurate, I suggest, to argue that, whereas the Principles (re)introduced Frege's work to the community, it was Principia that disseminated the logicist viewpoint and thereby indirectly cemented Frege's reputation as the founder of the logicist programme and mathematical logic.
In this sense, William C. Kneale's assertion that Principia played the pivotal role in (re)directing attention to Frege and his work is somewhat idiosyncratic. In Kneale's words, the "Fregean" revolution owed much to Russell. He explained by saying that, so far as he could recall, no notice had been taken of Frege's death in 1925 and that he believed that at that time, … few philosophers had any inkling of the fact that as far back as 1879, in a pamphlet called BegriVsschrift …, Frege had produced the Wrst complete system of formal logic. This is not to say that his ideas had been entirely neglected in his lifetime. On the contrary, they had won great triumphs among mathematicians and philosophers through Principia Mathematica, the famous work of Whitehead and Russell, which appeared Wrst in 1910 and reached a second edition in the year of Frege's death. But Frege's own works were not read. On all suitable occasions Russell made generous acknowledgment of Frege's priority in the attempt to reduce arithmetic to logic; but there was a widespread impression that it was not worth while to read Frege's own writings, and so the greatness of his achievement was not realized in his lifetime. 2 Kneale does not make mention of the Principles of Mathematics, which, as we know, devoted considerable space not only to Frege's system, but to the theory of types as a means of circumventing the Russell paradox to which Frege's system, as presented in the Grundgesetze, gave rise.
Kneale's assertion therefore seems to ignore either the existence of the Principles or, at the minimum, suggests that it is subsidiary to the role of Principia in bringing Frege, and mathematical logic, to the fore. Rather, considering that Kneale says merely that Russell "made generous acknowledgment of Frege's priority in the attempt to reduce arithmetic to logic; but there was a widespread impression that it was not worth while to read Frege's own writings ...," 3 we might conclude that, if Kneale had it aright, then Russell, rather than Frege directly, was the instigator, but not the progenitor, of the "Fregean" revolution.
In so far as (2) is concerned, historiography of much of the twentieth century has held that there was a revolution in logic, one which overthrew the Aristotelian paradigm, based upon the grammatical subjectpredicate structure of ordinary language, in which the syllogism was the quintessential logical form of deductive inference. This same historiography also claims that the Fregean paradigm employed the functiontheoretic syntactic structure of analysis in place of the old subjectpredicate structure and that modus ponens was its preferred form of inference. Unlike the algebraic logic of the middle and late nineteenth century that oTered merely an algebraic reformulation of the Aristotelian syllogism, the new paradigm also exhibited a quantiWcation theory that was made possible by the introduction of the function-theoretic syntax. Whether Russell is given credit for consummating this seminal change in paradigm or not, and whether the greater part of Russell's credit is attributed to the Principlesz or to Principia, this ostensibly seismic shift is inevitably traced back to Frege, and to Russell's inXuence in helping to establish Frege's conception of logic. Paul Lorenzen (1915 Lorenzen ( -1994 his successors to say that 1879 is the most important date in the history of the subject." If I do not completely misjudge these and many similar statements, it is not only the singular magnitude of Frege's logical achievements that they refer to; it is also the bewildering impression that Frege created his logic, as it were, ex nihilo.
The ink was barely dry on the second edition of Principia when Paul Ferdinand Linke (1876-1955), Frege's friend and colleague at Jena, helped formulate the concept of a "Fregean revolution" in logic, when he wrote:
… the great reformation in logic … originated in Germany at the beginning of the present century … was very closely connected, at least at the outset, with mathematical logic. For at bottom it was but a continuation of ideas Wrst expressed by the Jena mathematician, Gottlob Frege. This prominent investigator has been acclaimed by Bertrand Russell to be the Wrst thinker who correctly understood the nature of numbers. And thus Frege played an important role in … mathematical logic, among whose founders he must be counted. 5 The concept of a Fregean revolution was explicitly expressed by Donald Angus Gillies; he argued the history of logic was marked by a "Fregean Revolution" in which the old Aristotelian paradigm of syllogistic logic was overturned and replaced by a mathematical, or "Fregean", paradigm.
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Heinrich Scholz expressed succinctly the principal points of the canonical historiographic interpretation and thus conWrmed and aptly summarized the conception of the "Fregean revolution", while accounting at the same time for Russell's role in carrying through that "revolution"; he wrote that:
7 "Wir sprechen von einem Sonnenaufgang, wenn wir den großen Namen Leibnizens nennen"-that "mentioning the name of Leibniz is like referring to a sun rising." 8 But he added that:
Between Leibniz and Russell there lies a tremendous amount of labor of which only the most important phasesz can be touched upon. In the 18th century 9 "Interlude" ["Zwischenspiely"] Unquestionably the greatest genius of modern logic of the 19th century was, however, the German mathematician Gottlob Frege (1848 Frege ( -1925 . More than anyone else he contributed to the interpretation of basic mathematical concepts in terms of the fundamental concepts of logic which operate with exact determinations right from the start. The Wrst one to do so, he raised the logical calculus to a level at which it turns into the "interlude" [sicz] 9 of which Leibniz had spoken. Nevertheless, he did not exert a direct and deWnitive inXuence, but in a roundabout way he did so by way of Russell's masterwork. The reason for this was that in spite of his thorough reXections he was not able to Wnd the type of plastic symbolism which we need for a "conceptual script." In this great task only the authors of the Principia Mathematicaz succeeded. With the appearance of this opus the new logic was called into being.
begriTe durch die GrundbegriTe einer mit einem genau bestimmten Ausgangsmaterial operierenden Logik getan und den Logikkalkül selbst erst eigentlich auf die Stufe gehoben, auf der er zu dem Leibnizischen "Zeichenspiel" wird. Und dennoch ist er selber nicht direkt, sondern erst auf dem Umwege über das Russellsche Meisterwerk durchgedrungen. Warum? Weil er, trotz alles Nachdenkens, die plastische Symbolik nicht hat Wnden können, die von einer "BegriTsschrift" gefordert werden muß. This view of the merits of Frege's work permeated much of the historiography of logic. Thus, for example, Kurt Friedrich Gödel (1906 -1978 also gave short shrift to the signiWcance of the work of the Booleans, dealing with it with far greater disdain and brevity than did Scholz:
… it was almost two centuries after his [Leibniz's] death that his idea of a logical calculus really suUcient for the kind of reasoning occurring in the exact sciences was put into eTect … by Frege and Peano.… It was in this line of thought of Frege and Peano that Russell's work set in.… It was only in Principia Mathematica that full use was made of the new method for actually deriving large parts of mathematics from a very few logical concepts and axioms. Vol. 5: 1884 -1886 , Modern Logicz 6 (1996 . with Frege and his BegriVsschrift emanated from Jean van Heijenoort, who bluntly wrote, in the posthumously published "Historical Development of Modern Logic", that:
13 "Modern logic began in 1879, the year in which Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) published his BegriVsschrift." In explanation, he expressed the concept of the BegriVsschrift as the fons et origo of modern logic, writing: "In less than ninety pages this booklet presented a number of discoveries that changed the face of logic," and adding that: "Frege's contribution marks one of the sharpest breaks that ever occurred in the development of a science." 14 James Van Evra readily concedes that Frege indubitably deserves credit for priority for developing a quantiWcation theory for logic, as well as other crucial innovations. He nevertheless also reminds us that Frege's work had little signiWcant inXuence until brought to the fore by the ministrations of Russell; that in the last two decades of the nineteenth century and into the third decade of the twentieth, it was rather the inXuence of Charles Peirce, particularly as presented and developed in Schröder's Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik, that was the source of inspiration for the work, for example, of Löwenheim and Skolem. Thus, Van Evra complained that Frege is unfairly given more credit than his work warranted. He complains that:
Accounts of the origin of modern quantiWcation theory often let Frege steal the show. They point out that he got there Wrst (BegriVsschrift (1879)), with a full rendering of quantiWcational logic which contained, within a single theory, both the quantiWcation of individuals in Wrst-order, as well as second-order quantiWcation of functions. Given the additional (often implicit) assumption that our current version of quantiWcation stems uniquely from him, it seems reasonable to ask why we should be concerned with another version of something which had already been discovered. 16 Gilbert Ryle, "Introduction", in Ayer et al., The Revolution in Philosophy, Gilbert Ryle (1900 Ryle ( -1976 attempted to answer the question of why and how Russell's work proved to be pivotal in consummating the Fregean revolution. His explanation is found in the assertion that once the idea of relation which was "made respectable" by De Morgan and the resulting relational inferences were codiWed by Russell in The Principles of Mathematics, then:
The potentialities of the xRy relational pattern, as against those of the overworked sy-p pattern, were soon highly esteemed by philosophers, who hoped by means of it to bring to order all sorts of recalcitrances in the notions of knowing, believing….
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On the question of Russell's role in familiarizing philosophers and logicians with Frege's work, there are those who suggest that, while some credit is due Russell, he was not the sole, or even the most inXuential, disseminator of knowledge of Frege's work. Quine at one point clearly gives abundant credit to Principia for familiarizing us with Frege's work, writing: "It was not until Whitehead and Russell's great Principia Mathematica (1910 Mathematica ( -1913 ) that Frege's inXuence perceptibly enters the mainstream.…" 17 But in his autobiography he seems to minimize the signiWcance of Russell's role in bringing full realization of Frege's importance in contrast with his own role, asserting Wrst that there was "no discoverable copy"
18 of the BegriVsschrift in America, and that he had to glean its contents instead from an "old review" by Philip Edward Bertrand Jourdain , 19 and then declaring that: 20 "My celebration of Frege" in Mathematical Logic (1940) "and in the classroom must have helped to bring people to see Frege as the father of modern logic." True, "Russell had introduced him to us long ago, but we remained unaware of how much had been done Wrst by Frege." For example, "I think 21 Ivor Grattan-Guinness, The Search for Mathematical Roots, 1870 Roots, -1940 Church Wrst learned from my book that his functional abstraction was in Frege." And Church "returned the favor three years later, pointing out that my notion of referential position and even my example of the Morning Star and the Evening Star were in Frege," although "I may have got the example through Russell."
At the very most, one can say, as Ivor Grattan-Guinness has, 21 that the publicity which Russell gave to Frege's work, starting with the Principles of Mathematicsz in 1903, brought a "higher level of attention" to Frege and his work than it had hitherto received, and that, as a consequence, he helped launch what has been called the philosophers' "Frege-industry", 22 rather than that Russell discovered, or even merely rez discovered, Frege and brought it to the attention of logicians. Nor can we overlook the importance in this regard of Jourdain who, though he may Wrst have become cognizant of Frege's work through references by Russell, himself played a crucial role in broadcasting and expounding the features of Frege's work for mathematicians, through his account of Frege in his multi-part history of logic.
Whether we adopt the view that it was Frege's work that actually initiated a revolution in logic or the view that Russell, either through the Principles or Principia, or both, launched the revolution that Frege conceived, we are still left with the question, suggested by Van Evra's remarks, as well as by later confessions by Quine and others, of whether Peirce was more inXuential in establishing such innovations as a theory of quantiWcation for his algebraic logic of relations than was Frege, even though Frege deserves credit for priority in establishing a quantiWcation theory for a function-theoretic logic, and of whether what occurred was a revolution in any proper sense. Quine, for example, came to alter his youthful view that Frege, helped by Russell and himself, initiated a Fregean revolution in logic, when, for example, he wrote:
General quantiWcation theory is the full technique of "all", "some", and The avenue from Boole through Peirce to the present is one of continuous development, and this, if anything, is the justiWcation for dating modern logic from Boole; for there had been no comparable inXuence on Boole from his more primitive antecedents. But logic became a substantial branch of mathematics only with the emergence of general quantiWcation theory at the hands of Frege and Peirce. I date modern logic from there. 23 He likewise confessed that "Peirce and not Frege was indeed the founding father" of quantiWcation; he had reminded us that the reason for this is that "Peirce's inXuence was continuous through Schröder's work, with side channels into Peano, culminating in Principia Mathematicaz ", while Frege still "had been a voice crying in the wilderness."
24 Quine, like Van Evra, would thus come to assert that there was a continuity of development; that the more signiWcant diTerences between the algebraic logicians such as Peirce and Schröder on the one hand and the "mathematical" logicians, such as Frege and Russell on the other, were (1) a choice of an algebraic structure for logic rather than a function-theoretic structure; and (2) the underlying philosophy, in particular the logicism of Frege and Russell, together with the Russello-Fregean concept of a logica docens as compared with the "Boolean" preference for a logica utens, or, as Jean van Heijenoort characterized it, absolutism and logic as language rather than relativism and logic as calculus. 
Grattan-Guinness might perhaps call a convolution.
From the writings of Peano, it is evident that he saw a link between the work of the "Booleans", including Peirce and Schröder, to his own work. Moreover, he saw Russell's work as Wlling a gap between their work and his own. In a letter to Russell of 19 March 1901, Peano explicitly declared that Russell's paper on the logic of relations of 1901 "Wlls a gap between the work of Peirce and Schröder on the one hand and the Formulaire on the other."
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This transition from the algebraic to the function-theoretic model for mathematical logic is a subject which I continue to investigate.
But the other aspect of the presumptive "revolution", as characterized, for example, by Gillies is the rejection of the Aristotelian paradigm in favor of the Fregean, and one of the salient factors of the paradigm shift is the replacement of the subject-predicate syntax for propositions with the function-theoretic syntax. Here, I suggest, there remain diUculties. One, which I wish to mention, but on which I will not spend much time, is Gillies' "textbook argument", in which he compares a handful of select logic textbooks of the pre-and post-revolutionary period. There are two Xaws in his argument: (1) the argument is statistically invalid, since Gillies picks only a handful of examples from each group; and (2) the comparison is unfair insofar as the textbooks selected were intended for diTerent audiencesz -z the pre-revolutionary textbooks having been designed for philosophy undergraduate students, whereas the postrevolutionary samples were written for mathematics graduate students.
The diUculty which I should like to devote some attention to is that, rather than reject out-of-hand the Aristotelian syllogism, the revolutionaries ought to incorporate the syllogism into their logical theory. Frege himself noted that only Barbara, Formula 65 in the BegriVsschrift, is universally valid when rewritten in his system. Frege also singled out what amount to the syllogisms Felapton ("No M is Pz z ; all M is Sz : therefore some Sz is not Pz z " (Frege's Formula 59) and Fesapo ("No P is Mz ; all M is Sz : therefore some S is not Pz z " (Frege's Formula 62) in the BegriVsschrift for translation. Whereas Wve of the seven syllogisms that Frege considered turn out to be invalid in his system, nevertheless, not only Frege, but Peano and Russell as well, sought to translate the Aristotelian syllo- In 1932, for example, Archie J. Bahm (1907 Bahm ( -1996 debated with Henry Bradford Smith (1882-1938) the question of the translatability of Aristotelian syllogistic into algebraic logic and into the language of Principia Mathematica. Smith took his start in the class calculus. He undertook to show, in his Symbolic Logic, how to deduce the postulates of Aristotle's system directly from the Boole-Schröder calculus, 30 and then set out to prove, in "On the Relation of the Aristotelian Algebra to That of BooleSchroeder", the consistency of Aristotelian "algebra" by showing how to deduce the postulates of the Boole-Schröder calculus from Aristotelian syllogistic, using respectively the deWnitions for Aristotelian inclusion ayp b and for the Boolean inclusion a 'z b. 31 Finally, after developing the Hamiltonian set of forms from the properties of the Boole-Schröder calculus in "On the Derivation of the Aristotelian Algebra from the Properties of a Hamiltonian Set", 32 and employing these to establish the characteristic features from Aristotle's logic of obversion, contraposition, and simple conversion where they occurred, and subalternation and the valid moods of syllogisms and using the forms of Aristotelian logic thus deWned, and expressing in terms of Boolean inclusion and deduced the fundamental properties of Hamilton's logic, he undertook to prove the invalidity of the equivalent of Barbaraz given in Principia Mathematica.
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Smith's aim, as described by KattsoT, was to determine: "What happens to modern logical theories if a new set of forms can be found by which Aristotle is vindicated?" 34 Smith's attitude towards the new sym- bolic logic, the motivation for his "rescue" eTort for syllogistic logic, and his choice of techniques in undertaking his rescue, as he himself expressed it, is found in his review of Clarence Irving Lewis and Cooper Harold Langford's Symbolic Logicz . 35 In view of our question of the role of Principiaz in establishing the Fregean revolution in logic, it is worth quoting in extensoz :
For more than two milleniums [sicz] the queen of the sciences had been viewed as a discipline begun and completed by a single man within the span of his own life. As late at the eighteenth century Immanuel Kant says in eTect: "While it is indeed remarkable that no one has been able to detect any Xaw in the logic of Aristotle, it is still more signiWcant that no one has been able to add an important word to what the Stagirite has said." This vast expanse of time corresponds to what we might term the "Wrst age of Wxation." The work of the scholastics and their successors, notably Leibnitz, so far as it concerns logic, had left only ripples on the current of human thought.
In 1846 Sir William Hamilton published the prospectus of A New Analytic of Logical Formsz, a solvent which was soon to make its power felt. No one has ever denied the immense scope as well as the thoroughness of Hamilton's learning, but nearly all historians have disparaged his critical sense. This criticism none the less inaugurated a development, and for years that immediately succeed, the ancient science is in a state of Xux. Two names, De Morgan and Boole, tell most of the story of this time of Xux. It is brought to an end by the labors of Peirce and Schroeder. The few years that follow might be termed the "second age of Wxation."
Meanwhile other solvents were being prepared. Frege had published his BegriVsschriftz in 1879, Peano had begun to issue his Formulairez in 1895, Whitehead produced his Universal Algebra in 1898, Russell his Principlesz in 1903. Finally, 1910-13, appears the Principia Mathematica of Russell and Whitehead. 36 Looking at the details, we see that Smith considered the fact that there were syllogisms valid in Aristotelian logic that were invalid in the logic of Principiaz , and set about to rescue syllogistic. His Wrst step was to provide a new interpretation for the four categorical propositions, and then to demonstrate, with the aid of this rewriting, that every inference valid in traditional logic is also valid in symbolic logic. His interpretation treats the terms of the traditional proposition as classes, and the copula as expressing a relation between these classes. For classes az and bz , the Az , Ez , Iz , and Oz propositions concern relations between az , bz , and bN, where bN is the class of all not-bz . Thus, in Symbolic Logicz the Az -proposition "All Az are Bz ", expressed in Smith's notation as Az z (az , bz ), asserts that ay<z b, to be understood as the relation whose full meaning is
according to which we have that az implies bz is to be interpreted to mean that az is included in bz and either bz is included in az or it is false that az is included in not-bz and also false that not-bz is included in az . Here, "<" (also written, e.g. in an early work, as "p") is understood in the usual sense for the Boole-Schröder algebra as either class inclusion or implication, or the copula, with concatenation (and easily replaced notationally by using ".") doing duty for logical multiplication (i.e. conjunction or intersection), "+" as logical addition (i.e. disjunction or union), and "N" as complementation (negation). With this, he interprets "No A is Bz " as the relation equivalent to "All A is non-Bz ", so that we have az < bN, which we can similarly expand to express the full relation. The Iz and Oz propositions are then obtained by taking the contradictories of A and Ez , respectively. Neither Bahm nor Smith directly or indirectly mentions  10.26 or  10.3 of Principiaz in their debate with one another, despite its obvious relevance.
In "On the Relation of the Aristotelian Algebra to That of BooleSchroeder", Smith argues that "a < bz " represents the Aristotelean proposition "a included in bz ", while "a ' bz " represents the Boolean proposition "az included in bz ", and then argues that the two are logically equivalent, giving the deWnition
or, by substitution, a ' bz = az +yb + aNa < a + bbN < bN, to permit easy passage between the Aristotelian and Boolean systems.
These deWnitions are then used to consider the relations from among those given by the traditional square of opposition and is asserted to allow one to treat empty classes as unproblematical within the Aristotelian system as they are for the modern (Boolean) square of opposition.
In "On the Derivation of the Aristotelian Algebra from the Properties of a Hamiltonian Set", Smith noted that Hamilton criticized Aristotelian logic for its failure to quantify over predicates. The purpose of "On the Derivation …" is therefore to derive the properties of a Hamiltonian set of forms from the properties of the Boole-Schröder logic and from these in turn to establish the characteristic inferential properties of Aristotelian logic, in particular obversion, contraposition, simple conversion in the cases where they obtain, subalteration, and the valid moods of the syllogism. Smith determines that all of the Aristotelian characteristics hold except for the reXective property for the "all are" relation, which alone fails, in the limiting case of the empty universe. The basic forms are immediately obtained:
From the standpoint of natural language, "some" is understood to exclude the possibility of "all". We can therefore understand the Hamiltonian forms in terms of Boolean inclusion, and the fundamental properties of Hamiltonian logic can be derived. For Boolean inclusion, we have
where the overbar is the denial of the proposition. In Hamiltonian logic, we therefore obtain was with its interpretation of "xz implies yz " as "either not xz or yz ". Much of the vast apparatus behind Smith's translations between Aristotelian, Boole-Schröder, and Hamiltonian forms was designed explicitly to answer to this equivalence, with the ultimate goal of justifying the relations between the propositions of the traditional square of opposition. In response, Bahm argued, in "Henry Bradford Smith on the Equivalent Form of Barbara", that Smith failed to prove the invalidity of the equivalent of Barbaraz given in Principia Mathematicaz as Smith claimed to do by his method of translation.
37 Two years later, this discussion was also joined by Paul Henle (1902 Henle ( -1962 who examined Smith's system in greater detail than did Bahm. 38 Henle, examining the arguments of both Smith and Smith's defender Louis Osgood KattsoT (1908 KattsoT ( -1979 , 39 admits, in opposition to KattsoTz 's assertion, that Smith's system is selfconsistent. But Henle concludes that it is nevertheless "diUcult to see" Smith's system as equivalent to Aristotelian logic. 40 KattsoT concluded that it is totally obvious that "the question of the existential import of propositions is solved negatively once and for all by a suitable deWnition of the four categorical relations."
41 KattsoT bases his argument upon the consequences of the system of Smith's logic for the traditional square of opposition. Henle and KattsoT examine the relation among propositions obtaining in Smith's system and note that there are those elements of the traditional square of opposition that do not hold in Smith's translation of Aristotle's logic. In particular, Henle argues that the Principles of Contradiction and Excluded Middle would have to be excised from Aristotelian syllogistic if Smith and Aristotle's system were to be considered to be equivalent, given that, on Henle's understanding, both principles are assumed to be false in Smith's system. Smith responded to Henlez 's arguments by asserting that, taking the Principle of Contradiction to assert that "No proposition of the form 'Sz is both Pz and non-Py' can be true", we should be permitted to infer from it that "No entity is both red and non-red", which Smith's system holds to be true. Given the class of entities is the universe (1) is the empty class (0), Ez z (1, 0) is true in Smith's system. The diUculty, Henle continues, is that any further speciWcation yields a false statement. He gives such examples as "No chair is both red and non-red" as false while their contradictories are true. That is, Ez z (az , bz ) is false for bz = 0 and a … 1 once we particularize the universe of discourse. Moreover, once a singular proposition is regarded as a universal proposition, as it is in traditional logic, the two assertionsz -z that some particular chair is both red and non-red, and that some particular chair is not both red and non-redz -z are true. Henle concludes: "This not only involves a breakdown of one of the laws of logic most Wrmly established by tradition, but also is repugnant to common sense" (p. 112). In reply, Smith notes that Henle's critique relies in these instances upon ontological and psychological, rather than purely logical, considerations of the Principle of Contradiction. 42 With the basic deWnitions and translations established, Smith examines syllogistic relations for az , bz , cz , dz , acz , and bdz , including those under which condition any one of the four terms is represented as iz , where iz is either the empty class (0) or the universe (1). Thus, for example, Ez z (az , bz ) is false if bz = 0 and a … 1. So, although Henle tells us that he fails to see how Smith's system is equivalent to Aristotle's, Smith's response is that Henle is here confusing the logical version of the Principle of Contradiction with the ontological or psychological version.
The literary debate regarding the relation between traditional logic and the new logistic that was raised by the question of existential import of propositions in which Russell and MacColl had engaged was thus continued a generation later in light of results of Principiaz . Thus, for example, Filmer Stuart Cuckow Northrop (1893 Northrop ( -1992 and Andrew Paul Uchenko (or Ushenko; 1900 -1956 ) debated the existential import of universal aUrmative propositions in Aristotelian categorical logic. Smith dealt with this issue by arguing that 0 and 1 are limiting conditions on the translation between the Aristotelian and Boolean arrangements concerning the relations between the A, Ez , Iz and Oz propositions given in the traditional square of opposition, for terms az , bz , cz , dz . Thus, for example, letting kz z (ab) and lz (abz ) be any of the Hamiltonian forms, then, provided kz z (abz ) and lz (abz ) are not identical (and taking gz z (abz ) and gz z (baz ) as distinct), then kz z (abz ) . lz (abz ) = 0, since, Smith explains (Symbolic Logicz , p. 291), each of the forms (az )-(hz ) contains a term that contradicts a term in one of the other forms (az )-(hz ). Adding, then, the forms Uz and Vz to the traditional Az , Ez , Iz , and Oz forms, where, now Azz(abz) = az z(abz) + gz z(abz) wwwyall a is b Ezz(abz) = az z(abN) + gz z(abN), hz z(abz) + ez z(abz) wwwyno a is b Uzz(abz) = az z(aNbz) + gz z(aNbz), dzz(abz) + hz z(abz) wwwyall non-a is b Ozz(abz) = az z(abz) + bz z(abz) + gz z(baz) + dz z(abz) + z(abz) + hz z(abz)wsome a is not b Izz(abz) y= az z(abz) + bz z(abz) + gz z(abz) + gz z(baz) + dz z(abz) wwyyyzsome a is b Vzz(abz) = az z(abz) + bz z(abz) + gz z(abz) + gz z(baz) + dz z(abz) wsome non-a is not b, we obtain the contradictory pairs A and Oz , Ez and Iz , and Uz and V, so that Az z (abz ) . Ez z (abz ) = 0 and Az z (abz ) . Uz z (abz ) = 0, and, with the proper algebraic computations, we satisfy the traditional square of opposition even in the face of the empty class. What Bahm argued is that Smith failed in his attempt to demonstrate that the Russellian equivalent of Barbaraz is invalid, despite all the translation apparatus that he had devised for the purpose.
Examining the details, Smith wrote in Symbolic Logicz that Russell's deWnition of implication is erroneous, and (reading "<" now as implication) depends upon establishing that a < (b < cz ) is equivalent to ab < c. Smith's argument, Bahm asserts, depends upon showing that Russell's
